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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the design and implementa-
tion of a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). 
This architecture tackle with the data exchange 
different elements onboard the Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) and the real-time safety-critical 
operation of In-Flight Awareness Augmentation 
System (IFA
2
S) and non-safety critical Mission 
Oriented Sensors Array (MOSA), respectively to 
take care of flight safety and mission accomplish-
ment. The IFA and MOSA systems implemented 
and evaluated using the Software-In-The-Loop 
(SITL) simulation technique. The case study 
conducted had several critical situations were as-
sessed through the sensors, then a diagnosis was 
made, and finally, a decision was made as a 
safety measure. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The recent advances in onboard systems of Un-
manned Aerial Aircraft (UAV) aims both flight 
safety and mission management, where In-Flight 
Awareness Augmentation System (IFA
2
S) [1] and 
Mission Oriented Sensors Array (MOSA) [2] are 
examples of systems focused on these as- 
 
 
pects. In order to be integrated into an aircraft, 
these subsystems shall comply with many differ-
ent requirements such as time constraints, share 
computational resources and share the data from 
several sensors [3]. In order to enable flexibil-ity, 
improve data management efficiency and be-
come easier future integration (either services or 
hardware), it is necessary to have an environ-
ment capable of dealing with different tasks, pro-
tocols, time constraints, and priorities. Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA) provides this envi-
ronment using a middleware that enables infor-
mation interchange between services on a loose 
coupling [7] and [8].  
Although IFA
2
S and MOSA have different 
purposes (flight safety improvement and mission 
accomplishment efficiency, respectively), most 
data used by both come from same sensors and 
they share most of the information. Both systems 
act as service providers and consume data from 
sensors, which are also considered as service 
providers. The subsystem IFA
2
S is a safety 
critical, real-time system designed to semi-
automatically (with human supervision) identify 
and avoid flight hazards and accidents. These 
problems come from either internal or external 
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causal factors. MOSA is a non-safety 
critical sys-tem designed to manage the 
mission accomplish-ment by decoupling the 
mission-oriented part of the system from 
the aircraft control systems (safety-critical).  
The IFA
2
S is a novel autonomous decision-
maker onboard the aircraft aiming to improve 
flight safety. It makes the UAV more conscious 
(situational awareness increase) about its sub-
systems conditions (internal health), flight pro-
file, intruders presence (other aircrafts), and 
sur-rounding conditions (ground and 
meteorological) by keeping pilots on the ground 
as system man-agers. It provides a platform 
that is Situational Awareness (SA), instead of 
relying on human pi-lots’ perceptions. It allows 
the system to act as soon as it identifies a 
situation that potentially leads to an accident.  
MOSA is an architecture created to im-
prove mission management during the flight [2]. 
The integration of MOSA with a set of sen-sors 
provides information for specific applica-tions. 
MOSA also manages mission accom-plishment 
during flight and interfaces with the safety-
critical part of the UAV (automatic pilot). In 
addition to the hardware, a MOSA system also 
includes the software necessary to carry out a 
mission, communicate with all sensors, and 
send/receive data to the aircraft.  
The MOSA and IFA
2
S systems have been de-
signed in a modular way allowing that new plan-
ning and replanning algorithms may be added to 
the system without significant modifications [4]. 
Another feature of the platform is to be plug-in-
play by allowing new sensors and hard-ware 
equipment to be easily coupled by chang-ing only 
a few configuration files and a few sys-tem 
changes in some cases. Another advantage of the 
platform is the facility of making changes in the 
missions without a high cost of time. Al-though the 
MOSA and IFA
2
S systems are general and can 
be used in several UAVs, they have been thought 
to run at low cost and low weight UAVs.  
The present paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents some related work and Sec-
tion 3 defines the problem to be studied. The 
proposed SOA architecture is introduced in Sec- 
 
 
tion 4 and experimental results are reported 
in Section 5. The conclusion of this work 
follows in Section 6. 
 
2 Related Work 
 
A Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) was pre-
sented in [9] for UAVs with the objective of au-
tomating the control of mosquito that are vectors 
of diseases such as malaria and dengue. A 
system of surveillance, control, suppression and 
elimina-tion of vectors is introduced. The authors 
pro-pose a software solution, where the Auto Pilot 
(MedizDroids) is specialized for the problem ap-
proached. Unlike the work developed here, the 
work in [9] does not present an automatic route 
generation system for external environments, nor 
a safety system, nor it distinguishes the specific 
system from the mission (control) The control 
system (AP) becomes difficult to use the aircraft 
on other missions.  
The work on [10] has developed a cloud sys-
tem for the control of one or multiple drones 
applied to surveillance missions by tracking the 
GPS position of the device to be followed. The 
proposed architecture is mainly based on Internet-
of-Drones (IoD), where the application in the 
ground only deals with Web services, the 
interface with the cloud and the human-aircraft 
interface. The application in the aircraft is re-
served for the control of the web services, the in-
terface with the cloud and hardware. All process-
ing, mission control, data collection and UAV 
monitoring is allocated to the cloud application. 
Despite some similarities with the project pro-
posed in this article, the proposal of [10] has no 
route planning for obstacle avoidance as it does 
not have an aircraft health surveillance system.  
A mission-oriented architecture is presented in 
[11], which proposes a modular and generic 
system for the control of UAVs using computa-
tional vision in agriculture. The authors present a 
system that changes the current mission objective 
and implements corrections in the flight path after 
finding a new target. In this work, the companion 
computer Odroid U3+ was integrated with the AP 
Pixhawk and a Micro Arduino to control a quad- 
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copter. A mission-oriented system is also pre-
sented in [11], but no flight safety system or air-
craft analysis or route planning is proposed. 
 
3 Problem Description 
 
One of the proposals of this work is to develop an 
autonomous UAV by incorporating in it an on-
board computer, so it can autonomously perform 
missions. All mission management, safety and 
route is done on board the own aircraft.  
Several sensors/systems placed aboard the 
aircraft permit the system to be capable of detect-
ing flight-critical failures such as checking low 
battery level, GPS loss, AutoPilot (AP) failures. 
Thus, some decision-making needs to be made 
for aborting the current route and executing, for 
example, an emergency landing over a safe re-
gion, a vertical landing, a Return To Launch 
(RTL), or open the parachute as a last resort.  
Although the platform operates au-
tonomously, the mission designer should 
describe what he or she wants the aircraft to do 
such as informing the launch site, the mis-sion’s 
objective waypoints, the landing place, and 
where obstacles are in the scenario. All 
decision-making, for example, can decide how 
to achieve the objectives of the mission by 
making the deviation of obstacles. Thus, the 
MOSA system is able to do this autonomously. 
The IFA2 system can ensure that the aircraft 
during the flight executes a fast emergency 
decision under any critical failure.  
Figure 3 shows an example of the type of 
problem studied and how the MOSA and IFA
2
S 
systems solve this problem autonomously. The 
mission plan to be executed and the tasks of the 
MOSA and IFA
2
S systems are detailed next.  
Mission Plan: The UAV should start its flight at 
the point P1 (takeoff ) and proceed to the goal 
points P2, P3, ..., P6 and conclude it at P7 
(landing). This sequence of points determines 
the whole mission to be followed by the UAV 
that will take pictures at each region. The sce-
nario has two obstacles and No-Fly Zones 
(NFZ), which give the boundaries of the 
aircraft’s navi-gable environment. 
 
 
 NFZ 
safe area planned emergency route  
takeo   
P7 P5  
landing 
 
 
obstacle obstacle 
 
 
 
P3 P6  
followed mission by the UAV planned mission 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Illustrative scenario of the mission plan 
managed by IFA
2
S and MOSA systems. 
 
 
MOSA System: MOSA first plans the route 
that minimizes the aircraft’s fuel consumption 
between waypoints P1 and P2, and between 
way-points P2 and P3 and so on until P6 and 
P7. Next, the system oversees the execution 
of the route by autopilot (green line in Figure 
3) as well as the right instant to start taking 
pictures over each waypoint.  
IFA
2
S System: The UAV may present a fail-ure 
such as low battery. The supervisor system 
(IFA
2
S) detects the failure and decides to abort 
the current mission. Therefore, the UAV control 
executed by MOSA is halted and an algorithm 
for path re-planning is executed. The new 
trajectory is now overseen by IFA
2
S (red line in 
Figure 3) landing the aircraft over a safe region 
(blue re-gion).  
Based on the mission specified in Figure 3, 
we can define a set of actions that the MOSA and 
IFA
2
S systems must execute to accomplish the 
mission. Figure 3 synthesizes through a flowchart 
the set of actions in which MOSA per-forms the 
calibration of the systems and performs the path 
planning between points P1 to P7. Next, the 
aircraft takeoff and rises until reaching cruis-ing 
altitude, follows the waypoints of the mission (P1 
to P7) and finally lands (P7). In parallel with 
MOSA, the IFA
2
S system also performs system 
calibration (for example, read AP parameters and 
get home location), and monitors the sensors for 
 
 
3 
VANNINI , ARANTES , MATTEI , FIGUEIRA , ARANTES , TOLEDO , TRINDADE , SAQUI-SANNES 
 
 
 MOSA Begin IFA2S  
 System   System  
 Calibrating   Calibrating  
 System   System  
 Execute Path  Monitoring  
 Planning   Sensors  
 Takeo    Has Critical N      
 
Ascend UAV 
  Failure?  
     
    Y  
N 
Is Altitude   Aircraft Is  
     
 Cruising?   Flying? N 
 Y   Y  
 Follow Wpts  Execute Path  
 Mission   Replanner  
N Mission  Alarm Sound  
 Completed?  
Emergency 
 
      
Y Landing  
Landing 
 
End 
 
Fig. 2 Execution flowchart of the MOSA and 
IFA
2
S systems. 
 
critical situations. If the aircraft is flying in the 
event of any failure, a new route is calculated, the 
sound of an alarm goes off, and the aircraft lands 
on that region aborting the current mission. 
 
4 Service-Oriented Architecture 
 
The design of the Real-Time Service-Oriented 
Architecture was accomplish by using Model Based 
Space System Engineering (MBSSE) with SysML as 
language for system definition [13], and the free 
software TTool [12]. The MBSSE is chosen for this 
project since it facilitates ap-plication of concurrent 
engineering in the early phases of the aerospace 
system life cycle, Phases 0, A, and B [14]. Phase 0 
refers to mission analysis and needs identification. 
Phase A is a feasibility study containing possible 
system con-cepts and assess its technical and 
programmatic aspects. Phase B establishes a 
preliminary de- 
 
 
sign definition by confirming the technical 
solu-tions using trade-off studies for the 
selected sys-tem concept.  
The SOA is responsible for the integration of 
service providers (e.g. GPS, cameras, accelerom-
eters, gyros and barometers) and high-level sys-
tems such as IFA
2
S, MOSA, the autopilot ser-vice 
providers and data consumers. It is imple-mented 
by using a deterministic design (same in-put 
always leads to the same output) capable of 
respecting time constraints in order to carry out 
common features and data exchange.  
The development of SOA by using a middle-
ware can be seen on the architecture depicted by 
the SysML block diagram in Figure 4. This soft-
ware architecture provides the autonomy neces-
sary to make the platform more capable for both 
managing its mission (non safety-critical service) 
and avoiding dangerous situations (safety-critical 
service). The design controls services and pro-
vides are both resources and priorities necessary 
for task accomplishment.  
The SOA middleware implementation ex-
plores similarities between services and makes 
it easier information access. The Resource 
Manager is the integration interface for sensors, 
IFA
2
S, and MOSA and uses standard interface 
SSP/SSI (Smart Sensor Protocol/Smart Sensor 
Interface). MOSA, IFA
2
S, and Reroute Plan-ner 
use sensor’s data for different purposes and the 
Resource Manager makes them available. 
Reroute Planner updates the mission route due 
to either an emergency or mission update. The 
Ad-mission Controller supervises the access to 
both Reroute Planner and Resource Manager 
giving priority to IFA
2
S in case of conflict with 
MOSA. IFA
2
S is an event based service and 
has prior-ity over MOSA when either sending 
orders or requesting data. The direct 
connection between IFA
2
S and the flight control 
surfaces aims prior-itize emergency landing in 
the case of autopilot failure. 
The communication between the IFA
2
S and 
MOSA systems occurs through the TCP=IP net-
work protocol using sockets. The IFA
2
S sys-
tem is the server and MOSA is the client in the 
application, indicating the order of initialization 
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Fig. 3 SOA architecture in which the MOSA and IFA
2
S systems were integrated into the UAV. 
 
of each system. Figure 4 shows in detail how the 
messages are sent. Once the MOSA system 
started, it will inform the IFA
2
S. Next, IFA2S in-
forms the home location of the aircraft (impor-tant 
parameter during the flight). Subsequently, the 
IFA
2
S informs that MOSA can start the cal-
culation of the route to follow. As soon as this 
calculation finishes, MOSA tells IFA
2
S that the 
route execution has already started. During the 
mission, if the IFA
2
S detects a fault, the MOSA is 
stopped and an emergency route is calculated by 
IFA
2
S. Finally, if during the execution of the 
mission any failure occurs in MOSA, the IFA
2
S is 
warned about such occurrence and initiates an 
emergency route.  
A robust detection, diagnostic, and decision-
making system were implemented on the IFA
2
S 
platform. To detect some event of abnormal be-
havior in the system, specifics sensors or a soft-
ware system must be used. A diagnostic step is 
initiated based on the sensing and system data. 
Lastly, basis in the diagnosis, an action must be 
done by the decision-making system. Figure 4 
shows the steps involved from the sensing to the 
decision-making by the IFA
2
S system. It is im-
portant to note that the platform described has not 
 
implemented some of the strategies that are to be 
made as future work. In the following example, 
based on Figure 4, it is assumed that the aircraft 
has a Power Module system capable of monitor-
ing the system’s current battery level. Through 
this sensor, low battery diagnosis becomes sim-
ple by comparing the current battery level with a 
threshold. In case the value obtained is smaller 
than the threshold, the system must take a secu-
rity action. The possible actions taken by the sys-
tem are to make the emergency landing, by firing 
an audible alarm alerting people on the ground 
that there has been a critical failure and that air-
craft will land quickly.  
In Figure 4, other sensors=systems were em-
bedded on the platform such as GPS, Autopi-lot, 
MOSA and IFA
2
S and Weather Forecast. 
Through these components, different diagnostics 
can also be evaluated. For instance, the location 
system may not have 3D fix, showing a GPS fail-
ure, and a vertical landing should be started im-
mediately. A bad weather condition may reveal 
that the aircraft should abort the current mission 
and return to base (RTL). A set of different sens-
ing, diagnostics, and actions have been evaluated 
and are described in the results section. 
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IFA2 S socket MOSA  
 
MOSA->IFA[INITIALIZED] 
 
IFA->MOSA[HOMELOCATION][DATA...] 
 
IFA->MOSA[START] 
 
MOSA->IFA[STARTED] 
 
Fl
o
w
 Case 1: If IFA
2
S system detected failure 
IFA->MOSA[STOP] 
T i m e 
Finished 
 MOSA->IFA[STOPPED] 
 Forced 
 MOSA 
 Case 2: If MOSA system fails in some operation 
 MOSA->IFA[DISABLED]  
Finished  
MOSA 
 
Communication Messages 
 
 
Fig. 4 Communication system between 
MOSA and IFA
2
S. 
 
5 Experimental Results 
 
A set of simulated experiments were conducted to 
evaluate our architecture. They were calibrated 
based on a quadcopter and the results are reported 
below. The scenario evaluated has dimensions of 
50m x 36m. The simulations are executed using 
Software-In-The-Loop (SITL) technique.  
The computer used in the experiments is an 
Intel i7 with 2.50 GHz, 16 GB RAM and Linux - 
Ubuntu 17.04 operating system. The route  
 
 
 Sensors - Systems Diagnosis Decision-Making 
 Power Module Sensor Low Battery Vertical Landing and 
 
GPS Sensor It's not 3D Fix  Alarm Sound 
  AP Status Critical Emergency Landing 
 AutoPilot AP Status Emergency and Alarm Sound 
  AP Status PowerO  
Open Parachute  
MOSA System MOSA's Failure  and Alarm Sound  
IFA2S System IFA2S's Failure   
 Weather Forecast Bad Weather For Flight RTL and Alarm Sound 
D
O
 Temperature Sensor Battery Overheating  
Motor Rotation Sensor Motor Failure 
 
T O
 
Increase Altitute Sonar or Laser Sensor Proximity to Ground  
 ABS-D or Proximity Sensor Intruder Aircraft Avoid Collision 
 
Fig. 5 Detection, diagnosis, and decision 
making systems of IFA
2
S. 
 
 
planning=replanning methods used were Hybrid 
Genetic Algorithm for the mission (HGA4m) and 
Multi-Population Genetic Algorithm for security 
(MPGA4s) developed in [6] and [5], respectively. 
The parameters of the route planning=replanning 
methods used are the same as reported in the lit-
erature [3]. The HGA4m ran within 4.0 seconds as 
time limit, and the assumed risk of violating an 
NFZ by the method was 1%. The MPGA4s per-
formed within a time limit of 1.0 seconds, mak-ing 
use of up to 25 waypoints and the risk as-sumed 
by the method was 1%. The altitude of the 
mission was 3.0 meters.  
In the first experiment, as the mission execu-
tion proposed in Section 3, it will evaluated the 
architecture created without considering the oc-
currence of a critical failure. In this study, five 
simulations were conducted, and their routes are 
presented in Figure 5. The red routes represent 
the routes calculated by the HGA4m method. It is 
interesting to note that between the points P6 and 
P7 two routes passed between the obstacles and 
three routes passed under the obstacles. No-tice 
in the image that some routes are overlap-ping. 
The blue routes represent the trajectory traveled 
by the UAV (obtained through the GPS) trying to 
follow the planned route in red. In gen-eral, GPS 
devices have a precision error associ-ated with 
each type of equipment and number of satellites 
captured. In this way, although this de-vice gives 
a specific location, it must be ques-tioned. In 
general, GPS devices have an error less than 1.5 
meters radius. Figure 5 shows a flow tube 
representing a region of uncertainty with 1.5 
meters radius at which the UAV can be located. 
Analyzing this figure, we realize that throughout 
the trajectory even with the GPS error, it does not 
violate the obstacles nor the NFZ.  
The faults described in Figure 4 have the 
AP Status Critical=Emergency=PowerOff and 
3D Fix diagnostics that, although implemented, 
were not evaluated since they are difficult to in-
clude in simulated environments. However, the 
Low Battery, MOSA’s Failure, IFA
2
 Failure and 
Bad Weather for Flight failures were fully evalu-
ated by three times each.  
The first critical fault studied is shown in Fig- 
 
 
6 
Service-Oriented Architecture to integrate flight safety and mission management subsystems into UAVs  
 
  NFZ  NFZ 
safe area   safe area  
Takeo    Takeo   
P1  
P4 P5 
 
P7   
Landing   Landing  
 obstacle obstacle obstacle obstacle 
   
 
 
 
 
 
P2 P3 P6 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Results obtained in the case study 
with SITL simulation. 
 
ure 5. The star represents the location where the 
critical fault occurred. In this way, we can see that 
the aircraft aborted the mission route and the UAV 
landed in the safe area (base) in the three 
evaluated cases doing the deviation of obstacles.  
Another result was critical fault detection in 
the MOSA system. The decision made for this 
type of failure is to perform a replanning of routes 
during the flight and aborting the original mission 
since the system MOSA presented some internal 
fault. Figure 5 shows three fault simulations of the 
MOSA system at different locations on the route. 
In only one of the evaluated cases, the air-craft 
could not land in the safe area.  
Similar to the previous experiment, some 
flaws in the IFA
2
S system were analyzed. In this 
case, the decision-making should decide to open 
the parachute, once no route planning could be 
carried out since the IFA
2
S presented problems. 
Figure 5 shows three simulations, where at F1, 
F2, and F3 points a critical flaw occurred in the 
IFA
2
S system. The landing of the aircraft using 
the parachute device occurred shortly after the 
critical failure detection by the system.  
A final experiment involving failures is shown 
in Figure 5. It can be observed the tra-jectories 
crossed by the aircraft after the system IFA
2
S be 
informed about the occurrence of bad 
meteorological conditions. In this way, the re-turn 
to base (RTL) action was triggered. In our case, 
the height of the configured RTL was 8 me- 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Results obtained considering the routes 
covered with a GPS precision error flow tube. 
 
ters, thus making the VANT overpass the obsta-
cles found in the scenario that have 5 meters. 
Some of the simulations previously 
described in the Figures 5 and 5 can be 
watched by videos highlighted in Table 1.  
With the above study of the architecture, a 
study on the time of writing (recording) of way-
points in the AP was made. Table 2 presents the 
results of this study, in which it is noticed that the 
recording time increases linearly with the num-ber 
of waypoints. This analysis reveals that, in 
general, it takes about 0.1 seconds to set=store a 
waypoint in the AP. The maximum amount of 
waypoints supported in AP as the pixhawk is 718.  
The codes of the implemented MOSA and 
IFA
2
S systems are available on the GitHub plat-
form: https://github.com/jesimar/UAV-Toolkit. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This article describes and evaluated a low-cost 
service-oriented architecture for UAVs. This ar-
chitecture was embedded on a quadcopter with 
an onboard computer in which several simulated 
experiments were performed. The MOSA soft-
ware system was able to properly manage the 
mission and route planning between waypoints 
safely, while avoiding obstacles. The IFA2 sys-
tem was able to react to failures that occurred 
internally=externally in the aircraft during the flight 
and managed to make the emergency land- 
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Table 1 Different simulations performed using SITL to validate the architecture.   
       Methods Evaluated    Description  Web Link  
        HGA4m   Full route without failure critical https://youtu.be/kh_mH3KcHe4  
 HGA4m and MPGA4s (emergency landing) Partial route with Low Battery https://youtu.be/WQm3tn7gMs4  
 HGA4m and MPGA4s (emergency landing) Partial route with MOSA’s Failure https://youtu.be/SYJopMU1Ehc  
    HGA4m and Open Parachute Partial route with IFA
2
S’s Failure https://youtu.be/-nawxwiTkiY  
       HGA4m and RTL   Partial route with Bad Weather https://youtu.be/aYOpoKobXmk  
                             
                          
         NFZ                NFZ  
   safe area   Critical Situation - Low Battery - Emergency Landing   safe area   Critical Situation - MOSA's Failure - Emergency Landing  
    Takeo     
F2 
    Takeo        
                         
F3 
 
                           
                     
  
Landing 
         
  
Landing 
  
 
  
 
             
         
F1 
  
F3 
            
F2 
   
                          
                           
                           
        obstacle  obstacle          obstacle  obstacle                               
                          
                              
 
 
F1 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Results obtained after the IFA
2
S 
detect the state of low battery and then 
make the emergency landing. 
 
 
Table 2 Summary of results evaluating 
waypoints writing time in AP.  
   
No of Waypoints PC Time Seconds/Waypoint 
5 waypoints 0.7 seconds 0.140 
10 waypoints 1.1 seconds 0.110 
20 waypoints 2.1 seconds 0.105 
40 waypoints 3.8 seconds 0.095 
80 waypoints 7.3 seconds 0.091 
160 waypoints 14.9 seconds 0.093 
320 waypoints 32.8 seconds 0.103 
640 waypoints 62.9 seconds 0.098 
718 waypoints 73.5 seconds 0.102 
   
 
 
ing. The quality of the routes obtained in SITL 
simulations was considered adequate since 
they avoided collisions with obstacles. The 
study of waypoint recording time in the AP 
reveals the im-portance of improving the 
(re)planners HGA4m and MGPA4s, since the 
updating time of in-flight routes increases 
linearly following the number of waypoints.  
Future work intends to evaluate the service- 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Results obtained after a critical fault 
oc-curs in the MOSA system and then the 
IFA
2
S makes the emergency landing. 
 
 
oriented architecture proposed in real flights. It is 
also intended to evaluate different companions 
computers such as Intel Edison, Raspberry Pi and 
ODroid XU4 in the scenario illustrated here. It is 
also intended to run the IFA
2
S system on a Real-
Time Operating System (RTOS) computer as it is 
a critical security application. 
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